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I. INTRODUCTION
erhaps the least controversial aspect of the Supreme Court of the
United States' recent decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.' was its recognition that law-
yers participating in a securities offering may be primarily liable under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the "1934 Act")
and under one of its amplifying rules, Rule 10b-5, 3 promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Indeed, in an otherwise in-
tellectually incoherent opinion based on an intellectually incoherent
methodology, 4 the Supreme Court has invited investors to sue attorneys
and other professional participants in fraud-tainted securities transactions
as primary violators of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.5 The Court, re-
* H. Edward Harter Chair of Corporate Law, University of Louisville. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by his research assistant, Paula Victoria
Miller, and by his administrative assistant, Rita R. Clayton, in the final preparation of this
Article.
1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C § 78j(b).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
4. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Central Bank: The Methodology, the Message, and the
Future; Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13, 25 (1995).
5. See Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? Attorney Pro-
spectus Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. REv. 885, 890 (1995).
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jecting aiding and abetting liability not as bad policy but as beyond the
scope of Section 10(b), stated, "Any person ... including a lawyer...
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable
as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met."' 6 After all, the Court ac-
knowledged, "In any complex securities fraud ... there are likely to be
multiple violators."'7
Certainly many, if not most, of the lawyers who have been held liable
as aiders and abettors under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could have
been held liable as primary violators.8 In fact, the distinction between
primary violators and aiders and abettors, according to SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, "seldom had any practical significance" before the Central
Bank decision. 9 This is because defrauded investors worked on the uni-
versally established assumption that aiding and abetting liability was
available to impose joint and several liability on those lawyers 10 and be-
cause aiding and abetting liability was easier to prove. Thus the Court in
Central Bank, by cracking the concrete of this long-held assumption, has
required defrauded investors to relinquish the expediency of a three-ele-
ment cause of action for aiding and abetting1 and return to the five-ele-
ment cause of action judicially implied for primary violators of Rule 10b-
6. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455. The availability of attorney primary liability
under Section 10(b) was confirmed much earlier by the Supreme Court in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddelston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), in its discussion of the cumulative nature of
federal securities law remedies. The Court noted that if Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 were the sole remedy for fraud in connection with registered offerings, -investors
would have no recourse against lawyers engaged in fraudulent conduct while preparing the
registration statement. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386 n.22.
7. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
8. See Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1438
(1994); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's
History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 888-93 (1995).
9. Hearing on the Recent Securities Law Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, Central
Bank of Denver vs. First Interstate Bank of Denver Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1994)
(prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
10. Justice Stevens's dissent in Central Bank reminded the Court that. all eleven cir-
cuits had adopted an implied cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for aiding
and abetting: Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 744, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); lIT v. Cornfeld,
619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793,
799-800 (3d Cir. 1978); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991); Fine v.
American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Moore v. Fenex, Inc. 809
F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Moore v. Frost, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987);
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); K & S Partnership v. Continen-
tal Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d
1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th
Cir. 1992); and Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988). The D.C.
Circuit had suggested such a private cause of action existed in Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson
& Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 n.1.
11. In fIT v Cornfeld the Second Circuit listed the three elements of the aiding and
abetting cause of action as follows: "(1) the existence of a securities law violation by the
primary (as opposed to the aiding and abetting) party; (2) 'knowledge' of this violation on
the part of the aider and abettor; and (3) 'substantial assistance' by the aider and abettor in
the achievement of the primary violation." HT, 619 F.2d at 922.
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The five elements of an investor's implied private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5 include "(1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact
(3) made with [the intent to deceive or] scienter (4) on which the [inves-
tor] relied (5) that proximately caused [the investor's] injury. '13 Lawyers
charged with primary liability typically defend themselves by attacking
the first and third elements of the offense. They argue that even if a mis-
representation or omission were made, it was made solely by the client,
not by the lawyer. They then argue the absence of intent, which in this
context normally involves the question of whether the lawyer's conduct
recklessly departs from the applicable standards of care.14 It is, however,
12. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,543 (5th Cir. 1981), modified
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Federal courts addressing implied civil liability
under Rule 10b-5 commonly enumerate five elements of the cause of action, sometimes
combining two or more as one or otherwise failing to separate or identify additional ele-
ments. Id. In addition to those five hereinafter identified, see infra note 13 and accompa-
nying text, proof of two additional elements is required: (1) the defendant's conduct must
be "in connection with" the plaintiff's purchase or sale of a security; and (2) the plaintiff
must suffer actual injury or damages. Huddleston, 640 F,2d at 555. Thus the "seven ele-
ments" of the implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 are as follows: (1) misrep-
resentation or omission; (2) materiality; (3) scienter; (4) reliance; (5) causation; (6) conduct
"in connection with" the plaintiff's purchase or sale; and (7) damages. Id. at 543, 555. In
addition, in order to satisfy the standing requirement, plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller
of the subject securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
13. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543.
14. In Magna Inv. Corp. v. John Does One Through Two Hundred, 931 F.2d 38 (11th
Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit stated:
We have defined "severe recklessness" as highly unreasonable omissions or
misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even inexcusable negli-
gence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.
Id. at 39 n.3 (quoting Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Every federal circuit has held that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for pri-
mary violators of Section 10(b). See Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co, 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st
Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); SEC v. Gotchey, 981 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished
disposition), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 927 (1993); First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559
F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. First Vir-
ginia Bankshares, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094,
1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1985); Woods v. Bar-
nett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 n.27
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reserved the question of whether reck-
lessness fulfills the requirement of scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976) ("We need not address here the question whether.., reckless behavior is suffi-
cient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5
(1980) ("We have no occasion here to address the question ... whether, under some cir-
cumstances, scienter may also include reckless behavior."); Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.4 (1983) ("[W]e have explicitly left open the question whether
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement."). In Central Bank, the Court commented
on the use of recklessness in an aiding and abetting analysis, but remained silent on its
appropriateness in a primary liability analysis. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455. Whether
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those very standards of care applicable to securities lawyers, requiring the
lawyer's independent determination of the appropriate level of disclo-
sure, which in most instances refute both arguments. Where the securi-
ties lawyer has failed to abide by these standards, he or she will have a
difficult time escaping liability by simply casting all the blame on the
client.
Thus, the requisite shift from secondary to primary liability should not
prove particularly difficult. Most fraudulent securities transactions in-
volving lawyer misconduct arise in factual circumstances that supply the
supplemental elements necessary for a primary violation. Moreover, am-
ple precedent both before and after Central Bank lends strong support
for a facile transition. 15 And, perhaps most importantly, assigning pri-
mary liability to securities lawyers more appropriately recognizes and re-
affirms their "unique and pivotal" role in modern securities law practice
and in the effective implementation of our securities laws. 16 After all, it is
the securities lawyer who controls the disclosure process and who under-
takes to align the interests of the client issuer with the client's investors.' 7
The role actually performed by prudent securities lawyers preparing
disclosure documents for both public and private securities offerings is
frequently either misunderstood or forgotten by judges, academics, and
other lawyers who are only occasionally confronted with professional lia-
bility issues in securities litigation. This gap in their understanding or
lapse in their memories is typified by such frequently repeated remarks as
"the lawyer is only a scrivener who papers the client's deal," "the lawyer
is entitled to believe his client," "the disclosures the lawyer drafts are
made solely by the client," "the lawyer is not a legal auditor," "the law-
yer represents the client and not the investors," and "the lawyer should
not tattle on the client." Yet virtually no experienced securities lawyer
could agree with any of these characterizations of his or her role in an
offering of securities. These statements are last gasp defenses argued by
trial lawyers in litigation; they are remote to the universe of a securities
lawyer's day-to-day practice. The securities lawyer involved in a securi-
ties offering, quite unlike the litigator, negotiator, or advisor in adver-
sarial contexts, is an essential participant. 18
In this Article, I will first provide a brief description of the role and
customary practices of securities lawyers in a securities offering in order
to demonstrate their authority and control over the disclosure process.
These customary practices, which reflect in substantial part the standards
the Supreme Court will follow the unanimous view of the circuit courts remains an unan-
swered question.
15. See, e.g., Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991) and Mo-
lecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991), for examples prior to
Central Bank. For a post Central Bank example, see Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler, &
Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
16. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973).
17. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
18. See Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
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of care applicable to securities lawyers as prudent experts' 9 in a highly
specialized field of law, derive from a number of disparate sources. These
sources include the ethical principles adopted by the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) and the country's highest state courts, the common law of
torts, the various cautionary statements made by the SEC, as well as the
views expressed by respected securities lawyers and scholars, and perhaps
most importantly, the instructive, standard-setting language found either
in the dicta or holdings of numerous judicial opinions. After briefly re-
viewing several of these sources, I will then address certain significant
decisions that have reaffirmed the securities lawyer's primary role in
managing the disclosure process. This will lead to my conclusion that a
securities lawyer whose conduct in preparing a disclosure document for a
securities offering recklessly departs from the standards applicable in this
highly-specialized area is not simply an aider or abettor, but a primary
violator of Rule 10b-5's antifraud proscription.
II. THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIES LAWYER
Any analysis of the securities lawyer's role as an integral and essential
participant in the securities offering must necessarily begin with the ques-
tion of why that lawyer is involved and what he or she actually does.
Given the complexity of state and federal securities regulation and the
attendant liability risks under a wide array of state and federal antifraud
provisions, the retention of experienced securities counsel is critical.
Consequently, any party who decides to raise capital through the issuance
of securities must retain an experienced securities lawyer in order to en-
sure compliance with state and federal securities law. These laws impose
an array of requirements for either registration 20 or exemption2' of the
proposed offering, which affect the practicability, structure, size, and
manner of the offering. These laws also generally require preparation of
a disclosure document for the intended benefit of prospective investors,
those third parties who the transactional participants, including the secur-
19. When the matter falls within a recognized area of legal specialty, such as securities
law, attorneys implicitly represent that they will abide by a more stringent "prudent expert
rule" under which their services will be measured against specialists in similar circum-
stances. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1. (1995). This "prudent
expert rule" has been amplified in numerous judicial opinions. See, e.g., Ramp v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal.
1961). See generally WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 720-
45 (4th ed. 1971).
20. 15 U.S.C. 77e (1994).
21. The statutory exemptions from registration are set forth in Sections 3 and 4 of the
Securities Act of 1933, which have been expanded by the SEC pursuant to its rule-making
authority. The most widely used regulatory exemptions from registration are found in
Regulation D, and more particularly in Rules 504 and 505, adopted pursuant to Section
3(b), and in Rule 506, adopted pursuant to Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. See generally
Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of
Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1990); Manning G. Warren III, A Review of
Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 355 (1984); Randolph H. Elkins & Larry M. Meeks, Regu-
lation D (BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 51-2d, 1994).
SMU LAW REVIEW
ities lawyer, fully expect to utilize the information disclosed to make in-
vestment decisions. The securities lawyer has first-line and last-line
responsibility for the production of this disclosure document-responsi-
bility which includes not only gathering, verifying, and presenting the in-
formation to be disclosed, but also making literally thousands of intricate
and complex determinations of what information is legally "material" 22
and thus necessary for actual disclosure to prospective investors. 23
Moreover, the securities lawyer has a far larger role than researcher,
fact checker, writer, and editor of the disclosure book. He or she is also
the production manager for the entire disclosure process, from develop-
ment of the disclosure plan to direction and implementation of the disclo-
sure process, to final publication of the presumably nonfiction work
disseminated by or on behalf of the issuer to prospective investors. The
securities lawyer's responsibilities as production manager minimally in-
clude the following:
(1) Engage in a preliminary review to determine both the client's
quality and integrity and any potential conflicts of interest that might
result from the engagement.
(2) Form direct and oversee a competent working group for the
disclosure process, including key officers of the issuer, the outside
accountants, the underwriter representatives, if any, and the addi-
tional lawyers and other persons he or she determines should partici-
pate in the disclosure process.
(3) Establish a due diligence environment for the issuer and work-
ing group in which every participant has been sensitized to the dis-
closure requirements of the securities laws and the attendant risk of
liability to investors.
(4) Conduct meetings with the officers of the issuer and other per-
sons significantly involved in the issuer's business to gain a basic un-
derstanding of the terms of the offering and its purposes; the nature
of the issuer's business, including its management, workforce, credi-
tors, major suppliers, customers, assets, liabilities, revenues, competi-
tion, and other business risks; and the regulatory schemes applicable
to the enterprise.
(5) Prepare a due diligence checklist for the issuer's management,
requesting extensive information covering every major aspect of the
issuer's organization, business, and management, and review the doc-
uments submitted to ensure satisfactory compliance with the request
22. A misrepresentation or omission is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider it important in determining whether to invest in
the securities. See T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S 438, 449 (1976); see also
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). Authors of a major text in the securi-
ties law field have observed that "for the securities lawyer 'materiality' is the name of the
game." RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
& MATERIALS 1023 (6th ed. 1987).
23. Numerous materials have been published that detail the securities lawyer's respon-
sibilities in the disclosure process. See, e.g., Alan S. Gutterman, Regulatory Aspects of the
Initial Public Offering of Securities (BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 60, 1993); CHARLES J.
JOHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 203-49 (1990).
[Vol. 50
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and to determine what additional information is required for prepa-
ration of the initial working draft of the disclosure document.
(6) Prepare and distribute a directors, officers, and principal
shareholders questionnaire covering each of these person's back-
ground and experience, including any involvement in bankruptcy,
criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings, ownership of the is-
suer's securities, business transactions with the issuer, and other in-
formation related to their knowledge and participation in the issuer's
business.
(7) Prepare a presentation format and then an initial working
draft of the disclosure document with appropriate headings for all
probable categories of information, after review of sample docu-
ments used by other issuers in the same or similar businesses and
after extensive consultation with the working group.
(8) Conduct and control an extensive "due diligence" investiga-
tion for the purpose of obtaining and verifying all material informa-
tion necessary for inclusion in the disclosure document. At a
minimum this would include, without limitation, a review of the is-
suer's organizational documents and corporate minutes; stock trans-
fer records and all documentation related to the issuer's or any
affiliates' prior offerings of securities; audited and unaudited finan-
cial statements; budgets; marketing, scientific, or engineering studies;
documents evidencing proprietary rights, including patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks; all of the issuer's material contacts with cus-
tomers, suppliers, and others; loan agreements; significant real and
personal property leases; employment contracts and employee bene-
fit plans; title opinions or policies relating to major real property
holdings; liability and other insurance policies; collective bargaining
agreements; all files related to pending or threatened litigation; all
government permits and licenses and governmental regulations ap-
plicable to the issuer; and all other internal and external documents
material to the issuer's management; the issuer's business risks; and
its proposed use of offering proceeds. In addition to review of docu-
mentation, the due diligence investigation also requires extensive
discussion of the information obtained, both with management and
various accounting, legal, marketing, and operational personnel; dis-
cussion of the financial statements with the issuer's outside auditors;
actual physical inspection of the issuer's major properties, plants, and
equipment; discussions with third party experts of technical, scien-
tific, or novel aspects of the issuer's business; and investigation of the
issuer's current and past relationships with employees, creditors, ma-
jor suppliers, and customers.
(9) Compare all information, written or oral, from each source
with similar information from all other sources in order to identify,
disclose, and reconcile material inconsistencies. This comparison is
part of a larger, ongoing responsibility not only to obtain and verify
information, but also to search for "red flags," a broad term encom-
passing not only such informational and source inconsistencies, but
all other matters that reasonably appear problematic, irregular, or
questionable, or that otherwise give notice that something of impor-
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tance has not been adequately explained or, if material, fully dis-
closed in the draft disclosure document.
(10) Write, edit, review, and revise various drafts of the disclosure
document, in consultation with the entire working group; confirm the
actual review and comment on the various drafts by each member of
the working group; and reach consensus that the final draft fully and
completely discloses all facts material to the issuer and its offering of
securities. Even given a consensus, the securities lawyer must exer-
cise his or her own independent professional judgment that the final
disclosure document provides an understandable and balanced pres-
entation of the strengths and weaknesses of the issuer and its securi-
ties offering, without obscurity, and that all textual statements are
adequately documented.
In the end, it is the securities lawyer, not the client or any other member
of the working group, who must make the final decisions as to what infor-
mation will be provided in the disclosure document and whether his or
her work product will be made available to the issuer for dissemination to
prospective investors.
The foregoing sketch of the securities lawyer's role in the disclosure
process is admittedly an insufficient guide for actual practice. The securi-
ties lawyer must consider numerous other matters in any particular secur-
ities offering depending on the registration form used as a disclosure
guide and the vastly differing circumstances of each particular issuer.
However, I provide it simply to demonstrate how the securities lawyer's
role markedly differs from the role commonly assumed by most other
kinds of lawyers in other types of transactions addressed by other areas of
the law. For instance, in normal law practice, the lawyer is generally con-
strained by the client to include or exclude various terms or provisions in
the transactional document; in the securities field, it is the securities law-
yer who dictates the content of the document. In fact, it is common for
the securities lawyer to become his or her client's benevolent adversary in
the disclosure process by forcing the client issuer and its management to
face issues they frequently would prefer to evade and by requiring disclo-
sure of sensitive matters that may reflect negatively on their achieve-
ments and the marketability of the proposed offering. Thus, the
securities lawyer's responsibility to ensure his or her own and his or her
client's compliance with the securities laws by controlling the disclosure
process serves to align both their interests with that of the investors pro-
tected by those laws.24
III. THE SOURCES OF THE SECURITIES LAWYER'S
STANDARDS
A. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The standards of care applicable to the securities lawyer's conduct, and,
indeed, the role those standards have established derive from many
24. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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sources. Both the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,25 adopted by most of the states' highest courts, and
the predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility26 serve gener-
ally as the foundation of the securities lawyer's standards of care.27 While
they purport to establish only minimum standards of conduct, they do
exert a statute-like influence over the behavior of lawyers. The most per-
tinent provisions are Model Rule 1.2(d), 28 prohibiting a lawyer from as-
sisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent;
Model Rule 1.16,29 requiring a lawyer's withdrawal where continued rep-
resentation could violate the Rules; Model Rule 2.3,30 addressing a law-
yer's evaluations for the use of nonclient third parties; Model Rule 4.1, 3 1
requiring truthfulness in statements made to others; and Model Rule
8.4,32 prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
The ABA has amplified its principles through the formal opinions of its
Ethics Committee. Perhaps the most pertinent of these are Formal Ethics
Opinions 33533 and 346, 34 which specifically advise lawyers in unregis-
tered securities offerings to fulfill their independent disclosure obligation
without blind reliance on the statements made by their clients. In Formal
Ethics Opinion 335, the organized bar provided its first formal statement
regarding the unique and pivotal role assumed by securities lawyers. It
emphasized that the securities lawyer cannot assume either the complete-
ness or accuracy of the client's representations, but must make his or her
own independent investigation where the facts are suspect, inconsistent,
open to question, or incomplete in any material respect.35 The securities
lawyer must test the answers received from the client against the underly-
ing records and other documents reasonably available. The ABA Ethics
Committee reaffirmed this opinion almost a decade later in Formal Ethics
Opinion 346 and added, "If the lawyer disagrees with the client over the
extent of the disclosure made in the offering materials or over other mat-
ters necessary to satisfy the lawyer's ethical responsibilities as expressed
in this Opinion, and the disagreement cannot be resolved, the lawyer
should withdraw from the employment .... -36 Both opinions came as no
surprise to securities lawyers with experience in preparing disclosure doc-
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1994).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
27. Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a
Double Standard, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (1996) (argues courts should permit the intro-
duction of the Code and Rules to establish the applicable standard of care for attorneys).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 ("Scope of
Representation").
29. Id. Rule 1.16 ("Declining or Terminating Representation").
30. Id. Rule 2.3 ("Evaluation for Use by Third Persons").
31. Id. Rule 4.1 ("Truthfulness in Statements to Others").
32. Id. Rule 8.4 ("Misconduct").
33. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974).
34. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
35. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335.
36. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346.
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uments for both registered and exempt offerings and who had long oper-
ated under standards that they continued to regard as considerably
higher. However, these opinions were standard-setting for tax lawyers
and other nonsecurities lawyers engaged by issuers in connection with
unregistered, exempt offerings of securities.
Then, in 1992, the ABA Ethics Committee added an exclamation point
to these earlier opinions. Formal Ethics Opinion 92-36637 stated conclu-
sions particularly relevant to the standards of care applicable to the secur-
ities lawyer's conduct in creating a disclosure document work product.
The opinion provided that "the lawyer must withdraw from any represen-
tation of the client that, directly or indirectly, would have the effect of
assisting the client's continuing or intended future fraud" 38 and should in
many cases "disavow any of [his or] her work product to prevent its use in
the client's continuing or intended future fraud, even though this may
have the collateral effect of disclosing inferentially client confidences ob-
tained during the representation. '39 The ABA's opinion went on to state
that "the term 'assist' [in Model Rule 1.2(d)] must be construed to cover
a failure to repudiate or otherwise disassociate [himself or] herself from
prior work product the lawyer knows or has reason to believe is further-
ing the client's continuing or future criminal or fraudulent conduct. '40
This opinion substantiates and reinforces the securities lawyer's power
and responsibility to withdraw from the engagement and to disavow any
disclosure document he or she has prepared if that lawyer knows or
should know the disclosure document is materially misleading and that
the client intends to pass it on to investors.
B. THE COMMON LAW OF TORTS
The interpretation given in ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 92-366 com-
ports with standards derived from the common law of torts, including, in
particular, those principles reflected in the American Law Institute's
(ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 526, 529, and 552(1).41
Section 526 provides:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes
the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the
confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or im-
plies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representa-
tion that he states or implies. 42
Section 529 provides: "A representation stating the truth so far as it goes
but which the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading be-
cause of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent




41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 529, 552(1) (1977).
42. Id. § 526 ("Conditions Under Which Misrepresentation Is Fraud (Scienter)").
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misrepresentation. '43 Section 552(1) provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, sup-
plies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exer-
cise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information."
These restated rules from the evolving common law of torts, which pro-
tect the interests of disclosure recipients by imposing liability-enhanced
responsibilities upon the suppliers of the information disclosed, have sig-
nificantly contributed to the standards of practice in the field of securities
law. These rules and the standards they have helped develop are particu-
larly critical given the securities lawyer's integral role in the disclosure
process. After all, a securities lawyer who prepares a securities offering
disclosure document directly participates in providing information to
third party investors for their reliance in making investing decisions. As I
have previously indicated, the securities lawyer, not the issuer, controls
the disclosure process and, by making literally hundreds of materiality
determinations, decides the quantity and quality of information to be in-
cluded in the disclosure documents. Thus, the disclosure document is, in
actuality, the securities lawyer's work product. By making that document
available to investors through the medium of his or her client issuer, the
securities lawyer in a very real sense "supplies" information to prospec-
tive investors. Because the securities lawyer undertakes for pecuniary
benefit the role of information supplier, it makes little difference whether
the information supplied to prospective investors takes the form of an
opinion accompanying the disclosure document or the form of the disclo-
sure document itself, or, for that matter, whether the lawyer or law firm is
named or not named in the disclosure document. The very structure, or-
ganization, and use of language in the disclosure document, coupled with
43. Id. § 529 ("Representation Misleading Because Incomplete"). See also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter PROSSER AND KEETON] ("... . half of the truth may obviously amount to a lie if it is
understood to be the whole. Again, one who has made a statement, and subsequently
acquires new information which makes it untrue or misleading, must disclose such informa-
tion to anyone he knows to be still acting on the basis of the original statement"). Rose v.
Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1207 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (citing both
§ 529 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and § 106 of PROSSER AND KEETON in
finding that a duty not to omit was part of a general duty to speak truthfully).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) ("Information Negligently Supplied
for the Guidance of Others"). See also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985)
(defendant/lawyer tried to frame plaintiffs/investors' charges in terms of malpractice since,
as attorney for the limited partnerships, he owed plaintiffs no duty, but the court quoted
§ 552 in finding a duty of due diligence); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1358-60
(N.J. 1995) (the court quoted from § 552 in finding attorney had a duty to third parties who
"foreseeably rely on the attorney's opinion or other legal services"). The Petrillo court also
looked to the reasoning in Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.
1991), in finding attorney owed a duty of care. Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1358. See also Atlantic
Paradise Assocs., Inc. v. Perskie, Nehmad & Zeltner, 666 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995).
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commonly held assumptions about its technical legal footing, offer con-
vincing proof to investors that the issuer's lawyer has prepared and signed
off on its contents. Moreover, the securities lawyer obviously anticipates
reliance by third parties on his or her work product (since this is a pri-
mary reason for the lawyer's retention) and is fully aware that applicable
standards require his or her independent professional judgment, based on
competent inquiry and verification, to determine what should or should
not be disclosed. Although these foregoing provisions of the Restate-
ment articulate principles of liability frequently utilized in litigation
against securities lawyers, they also serve as a source for the securities
lawyer's standard of care to avoid the creation or use of his or her work
product if it would materially mislead third party investors, whether by
omissions or outright misrepresentations of material facts. By allocating
liability to the drafter, these principles serve to inform the securities law-
yer's behavior in managing the disclosure process and producing the dis-
closure document.
The ALI's proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers45 re-
affirms these principles. Section 73(3) provides:
[A] lawyer owes a duty [of] care ... [t]o a non-client when and to the
extent that the lawyer knows that a client intends the lawyer's serv-
ices to benefit the non-client, and such a duty substantially promotes
enforcement of the lawyer's obligations to the client and would not
create inconsistent duties significantly impairing the lawyer's per-
formance of those obligations.46
In the draft comments, the ALI notes that the analysis is similar regard-
less of whether third party reliance is placed on the lawyer's opinion or
the lawyer's other legal services. The provision is intended to "promote
the lawyer's loyal and effective pursuit of the client's objectives," 47 partic-
ularly since the nonclient "may be better situated than the client to en-
force the lawyer's duties to the client" 48 because of the client's physical,
commercial, or legal inability to prosecute the claim.
The standards derived from these principles, as restated by the ALI, as
well as the duties these principles underscore, have resulted in a highly
desirable symmetry that effectively serves the interests of the lawyer, the
client issuer, and the client's investors.49 Stated most simply, the securi-
ties laws require the client issuer to make full disclosure to prospective
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No.
7, 1994).
46. Id. § 73 ("Duty to Certain Non-Clients"). See also Atlantic Paradise, 666 A.2d at
214 (despite claims by defendant law firms that they owed no duty to purchaser, the appel-
late court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the law firms, relying on
Petrillo's analysis which quoted § 731).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. f (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 1994).
48. Id.
49. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994). In this case, the defendant law firm conceded a duty to
investors in a securities offering, but argued it owed no duty to uncover a client's fraud nor
to advise the world of that fraud. According to the court:
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investors; the client retains and pays legal fees to the securities lawyer,
who in turn exercises the required independent professional judgment to
determine and provide the disclosures ultimately made; and the non-
clients to whom that information is supplied make investment decisions
that they presume will benefit them as a class when they transfer capital
to the client. In the first instance, the securities lawyer is obligated to
protect his or her client against liability for nondisclosure to nonclient
investors, and, concomitantly, to protect against his or her own liability
both to the client and these nonclient investors. As a consequence, these
nonclient investors are enabled by the lawyer to make informed invest-
ment decisions, which, after all, is the overriding policy of the securities
laws. In turn, the client is enabled to benefit from the nonclients' invest-
ments in its business enterprise. Thus, if the securities lawyer abides by
applicable standards, the interests of all participants, including his or her
own, are symbiotically connected for the achievement of each partici-
pant's objectives. Remotely distant from the lawyer's traditional adver-
sarial role, the securities lawyer, in effect, forges the connection between
the client and its investors to promote their common interests.
C. THE SEC's ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS
The SEC, as the administrative agency charged with implementation of
the federal securities laws, has never retreated from its longstanding posi-
tion that securities lawyers are charged with a public trust to assist in the
enforcement of its disclosure regimen. The SEC has repeatedly empha-
sized that the lawyers' duties extend both to the issuer and to the inves-
tors. The SEC's position has been advanced in aggressive litigation under
Rule 10b-5, its zeal exemplified best, perhaps, by its arguments in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp.50 Although its assertions in that case-
that the securities lawyer should be an undercover policeman-were
properly rejected, 51 the SEC nevertheless succeeded in heightening the
securities lawyer's standard of care. As a consequence, practitioners, mo-
[The problem with the defendant's reasoning] is its sharp differentiation be-
tween a "duty to investors," which it concedes, and a "duty to the client,"
which it denies. Given a broad duty to protect the client, this distinction is a
false one. Part and parcel of effectively protecting a client, and thus dis-
charging the attorney's duty of care, is to protect the client from liability
which may flow from promulgating a false or misleading offering to investors.
An important duty of securities counsel is to make a "reasonable, independ-
ent investigation to detect and correct false or misleading materials." This is
what is meant by a due diligence investigation. The [law firm] had a duty to
guide the thrift as to its obligations and to protect it against liability. In its
high specialty field, O'Melveny owed a duty of due care not only to the in-
vestors, but also to its client....
Id. at 748-49 (citations omitted). See also Edward Donohue, Attorney Liability in the Prep-
aration of Securities Disclosure Documents: Limiting Liability in the Face of Expanded
Duties, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 115 (1990). "Since the objective of counsel normally is to protect
the client from investor liability by urging full disclosure, in most instances the interest of
clients and investors should be compatible." Id. at 126.
50. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
51. Id. at 712-17.
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tivated in large part by fear of dire personal and professional conse-
quences, tightened up their disclosure and due diligence practices. In
coming to grips with their role as captains at the disclosure helm, they
forever rejected the "can do" response to clients made previously by a
large minority of the securities bar.
The SEC also has strongly influenced the behavior, and hence the stan-
dards, of securities lawyers through disciplinary proceedings under Rule
2(e) of its Rules of Practice52 brought against lawyers for "unethical or
improper professional conduct. '5 3 Although its Rule 2(e) decisions do
not purport to impose Rule 10b-5 liability on lawyers, they have been
significantly influential in the development of securities lawyers' duties to
investors and the evolution of standards of care applicable to securities
lawyers in adhering to their obligations in the disclosure process. In its
proceeding, In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp,54 the SEC emphasized
the vital role lawyers play in assuring adherence to the federal securities
laws:
Clearly, the Commission would be unable to administer effectively
those laws in an environment in which issuers ... were not routinely
served by professionals of the highest integrity and competence,
well-versed in the requirements of the statutory scheme Congress
has created. An incompetent or unethical practitioner has the ability
to inflict substantial damage on the Commission's processes, and
thus the investing public, and to the level of trust and confidence in
our capital markets.55
Similarly, in In re Fields,56 the SEC opined:
Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time again
that the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming
measure on the bar's shoulders. These were statements of what all
who are versed in the practicalities of securities law know to be a
truism, i.e., that this Commission... is peculiarly dependent on the
probity and diligence of the professionals who practice before it....
This is a field where unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable
harm on those who rely on the disclosure documents that they pro-
duce. Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately
rigorous standards of professional honor.5 7
Here, the SEC restates the truism that virtually all securities lawyers rec-
ognize: it is the lawyer who produces the disclosure document, and it is
the investor who relies on the lawyer's work in making investment deci-
sions. In perhaps its best known Rule 2(e) proceeding, In re Carter,58 the
52. 17 C.F.R § 201.2(e) (1995).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii).
54. Exchange Act Release No. 15,982 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,124, at 81,981 (July 2, 1979).
55. Id. at 81,991.
56. Exchange Act Release No. 5404 [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,407, at 83,172 (June 18, 1973).
57. Id. at 83,175 n.20.
58. Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 18, 1981).
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SEC added that when a lawyer has a significant role in effectuating his or
her client's disclosure requirements and the client fails to satisfy those
requirements, the lawyer's continued participation constitutes "unethical
or improper professional conduct. '59 Moreover, the SEC has continually
used remedial sanctions in consent decrees to enforce and publicize the
securities lawyer's standards of care. For example, in In re Ferguson,60
the SEC imposed numerous changes in the defendant bond lawyer's dis-
closure practices in connection with securities offerings. It required,
among other things, that the lawyer's engagement letter must emphasize
that his duties run to both the issuer and the investors in the issuer's se-
curities and that the lawyer must investigate both his own client and the
other participants in the securities offering in order to detect and correct
the information set forth in the disclosure document.61
The SEC's pronouncements have not fallen on deaf ears. They have
terrified the general practitioner, segregated a uniquely complex area of
highly-specialized practice, and upgraded the standards of care applicable
to securities lawyers. Over twenty years ago, one prominent practitioner,
in urging the securities bar to develop its own formal standards of care,
observed that the SEC "is most serious when it states that attorneys in-
volved in securities transactions must act as guardians of the interests of
the investing public."' 62 He agreed that securities lawyers, under even
then recognized professional standards, are not "alter egos" of their cli-
ents' desires but have responsibilities to the investing public, "particularly
where the law is designed to protect the public from fraud in securities
transactions. '63 After all, he acknowledged, securities lawyers, posi-
tioned as the draftsmen or reviewers of the disclosure document, must
continually decide, based on their own professional judgment, what mat-
ters are or are not material and thus ripe for disclosure to the investing
public.64 Although the securities bar has never formulated express stan-
dards, at least one subgroup, the bond lawyers, has published statements
addressing their disclosure roles and their professional responsibilities in
securities offerings. 65 The National Association of Bond Lawyers has ac-
knowledged the critical role of securities lawyers in the disclosure pro-
cess, including their rigorous investigatory and disclosure
responsibilities66 and their duties to investors who understandably and
59. Id. at 84,172.
60. 5 SEC Docket 37, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-4528 (Aug. 21, 1974).
61. Id. at 38 n.3.
62. James H. Cheek, III, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securi-
ties Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 617 (1975).
63. Id. at 619 n.45.
64. Id. at 631.
65. A.B.A. SEC. URB., ST. & Loc. GOV'T L., DISCLOSURE ROLES OF COUNSEL IN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OFFERING (1987) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE
ROLES]; NAT'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS, MODEL BOND OPINION PROJECT AND FUNC-
TION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BOND COUNSEL (1987); NAT'L ASS'N OF
BOND LAWYERS, STANDARDS OF PRACrICE (1989).
66. DISCLOSURE ROLES, supra note 65, at 17-18.
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predictably rely on their work.67 Clearly no securities lawyer can argue
with a straight face that he or she is merely a green eye-shaded trans-
criber in the backroom who puts pen to paper to record the dictation of
his or her client. On the contrary, the securities lawyer operates under
standards that require his or her control over the flow of information to
the client's investors. Controlling the flow is primary participation in any
offering of securities.
D. STANDARDS DERIVED FROM JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
The standards applicable to securities lawyers are also derived from
instructive pronouncements set forth in numerous judicial opinions ad-
dressing the role of lawyers in preparing disclosure documents for offer-
ings of securities. Although actual judicial holdings, some of which I will
address in the succeeding section of this Article, certainly have influenced
the development of those standards, judicial expressions in securities law
opinions, whether categorized as dicta or holdings, have significantly af-
fected the behavior of securities lawyers involved in the preparation of
disclosure documents. This critical distinction must be observed because
prudent securities lawyers do not perform their services on the line of
liability, but far above it. Unlike trial lawyers who sometimes view them-
selves as hired guns at shootouts or transactional lawyers who sometimes
shape their clients' conduct so as to stay barely within the margins of the
law, securities lawyers are noted for their refined sensitivities to highly
technical disclosure requirements and a marked skepticism tantamount to
suspicion. Because their responsibilities are to detect and disclose, fully
aware of third party reliance on their work product, they strive to follow
both the letter and spirit of the securities laws. Thus, performance based
standards have developed not so much from rulings for or against a par-
ticular lawyer, but from insights gained independent of the outcome from
judicial expressions regarding the securities lawyers' role.
Of course, I cannot begin to make an all-inclusive list of these behav-
ior-shaping judicial statements, and, accordingly, I will only provide some
of the more important ones that are perhaps most frequently referred to
by the securities bar and by judges addressing professional misconduct in
the context of securities litigation. An appropriate starting point is to
examine statements made by Judge Friendly in two important decisions
rendered some thirty years ago, United States v. Benjamin68 and SEC v.
Frank.69 In Benjamin, a criminal case brought against a lawyer and
others involved in an offering described as "another of those sickening
financial frauds," 70 the court rejected the defense of ignorance asserted
67. "Most bond counsel probably consider ... that their most significant responsibili-
ties are to the ultimate investors .... " Id. at 16.
68. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
69. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
70. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 856.
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by the lawyer for the promoter. In his now oft-cited conclusion that the
lawyer had committed wilful fraud, Judge Friendly stated:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent
than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean
that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject an
attorney or accountant to criminal liability simply because more
skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress
equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out as
members of these ancient professions should be able to escape crimi-
nal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to
what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they
knew they did not possess.71
Similarly, in SEC v. Frank, Judge Friendly flatly rejected the lawyer's "I
am only a scrivener" defense and stated:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with
regard to securities which he knows to be false simply because his
client has furnished it to him .... [A] lawyer, no more than others,
can escape liability from fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and
could readily understand. 72
Then Judge Kaufman, in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. ,73 in an opinion adopt-
ing the SEC's view that securities lawyers have public trust responsibili-
ties, stated:
The securities laws provide a myriad of safeguards designed to pro-
tect the interests of the investing public. Effective implementation of
these safeguards, however, depends in large measure on the mem-
bers of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in
securities transactions. The standard of diligence demanded of the
legal profession to meet this responsibility is a matter on which we
are required to comment .. .74
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective
implementation of the securities laws. Questions of compliance with
the intricate provisions of these statutes are ever present and the
smooth functioning of the securities markets will be seriously dis-
turbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an at-
torney when he or she renders an opinion on such matters. 75
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an
opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high
to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience.
The public trust demands more of its legal advisers than 'customary'
activities which prove to be careless.76
It is important to note that Judge Kaufman expressly rejected the argu-
ment that an investigatory burden upon lawyers engaged in "customary
71. Id. at 863.
72. Frank, 338 F.2d at 489.
73. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 536.
75. Id. at 541-42.
76. Id. at 542.
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business activities" would be too great. The court pointed out, in effect,
that the securities lawyer participating in an offering of securities is not
performing "customary" or "routine" legal services, particularly given his
or her knowledge that nonclient investors will substantially rely on the
lawyer's work product.77 Instead, because of his or her unique and piv-
otal role in the disclosure process, the securities lawyer is a primary par-
ticipant with unique duties to prospective investors.
Perhaps the most influential decision regarding lawyer behavior in con-
nection with the preparation of disclosure documents is Escott v. Bar-
Chris Construction Corp.78 The court began by noting the "unique
position" which the attorney occupied as the person "most directly con-
cerned with writing the registration statement and assuring its accuracy"
and that "more was required of him in the way of a reasonable investiga-
tion."'79 Despite the court's finding that the lawyer "honestly believed
that the registration statement was true and that no material facts had
been omitted,' 80 the court concluded that he had not made a reasonable
investigation. In reaching this conclusion, the court made a number of
highly instructive observations:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of
his client and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set
an unreasonably high standard. This is too broad a generalization. It
is all a matter of degree. To require an audit would obviously be
unreasonable. On the other hand, to require a check of matters eas-
ily verifiable is not unreasonable. Even honest clients can make mis-
takes. The statute imposes liability for untrue statements regardless
of whether they are intentionally untrue. The way to prevent mis-
takes is to test oral information by examining the original written
record.
There were things which [the lawyer] could readily have checked
which he did not check. For example, he was unaware of the provi-
sions of the agreements between [the issuer and the factor]. He
never read them. Thus, he did not know, although he readily could
have ascertained, that [the issuer's] contingent liability on ... lease-
back arrangements was [one hundred percent], not twenty-five per-
cent. He did not appreciate that if [the issuer] defaulted in
repurchasing delinquent customers' notes upon [the factor's] de-
mand, [the factor] could accelerate all the customer paper in its
hands, which amounted to over $3,000,000.81
As far as customers' delinquencies are concerned, although [the
lawyer] discussed this with [management], he again accepted the as-
surances of [management] that no serious problem existed. He did
not examine the records as to delinquencies, although [the issuer]
maintained such a record. Any inquiry on his part of [the factor] or
77. Id.
78. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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an examination of [the issuer's] correspondence with [the factor]...
would have apprised him of the true facts.
... '[The lawyer] was obliged to make a reasonable investigation. I
am forced to find that he did not make one. After making all due
allowances for the fact that [the issuer's] officers misled him, there
are too many instances in which [the lawyer] failed to make an in-
quiry which he could easily have made which, if pursued, would have
put him on his guard. 82
The lawyer defendant in Escott was sued as a director of the issuer under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Nonetheless, the court's lan-
guage has been broadly accepted by securities lawyers as integral to their
standards of care whenever they are engaged as draftsmen of disclosure
documents for public or private securities offerings.8 3
The significance of the statements from the foregoing opinions is exem-
plified by frequent reference to them in both legal literature84 and in the
cases which succeeded them. Although these pronouncements only gen-
erally outline the applicable standards, courts have found them quite use-
ful as constructs for analysis in assessing particular lawyer behavior. This
is perhaps best illustrated in Felts v. National Account Systems Ass'n,85 in
which the court looked to Spectrum (which cited Benjamin), Frank, and
Escott to identify the "special duties" to investors imposed on a lawyer
preparing securities disclosure documents, including "the obligation to
exercise due diligence," the duty never to "assist the [issuer] circulate
statements he knows or should know to be false simply because they were
furnished to him by the client," and the duty to "make a reasonable, in-
dependent investigation to detect and correct false or misleading materi-
als."' 86 Then, applying the corollary standards of care to the facts, the
court concluded that the lawyer defendant breached his special duties of
diligent investigation and disclosure by failing to make a reasonable in-
quiry to ascertain the truth or falsity of the representations furnished to
him by his client. Accordingly, the court held that the lawyer defendant
was a "participant" in the sale and thus liable as a primary violator of
82. Id. at 692.
83. According to one practitioner, "fairly standardized procedures of due diligence
have been generally established and well publicized by the bar ever since the [Escott v.]
BarChris decision slammed home the need to check the written record and to document all
investigatory and verification efforts." Cheek, supra note 62, at 629. These due diligence
standards, of course, are applicable both to public and private offerings of securities. An-
other practitioner states:
Attorneys must be cognizant of the risks of engagements involving clients
with short or poor track records or risky business plans. Because they are
usually new ventures, and placement agents assuming due diligence responsi-
bilities are often not involved, private placements are inherently more risky.
Considering the increased risks and the attorney's potential status as the only
independent party to the due diligence process, the investigatory aspects of
the engagement arguably should be as broad or broader than for public
offerings.
Donohue, supra note 49, at 140.
84. See, e.g., Cheek, supra note 62; Donohue, supra note 49.
85. 469 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
86. Id. at 67.
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Rule 10b-5.8 7
IV. JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF PRIMARY LIABILITY
In recent years, both prior and subsequent to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Central Bank, the courts have not been reluctant to impose pri-
mary liability on securities lawyers engaged in the preparation of
disclosure documents for securities offerings. Although the decisions
have been by no means consistent, with several concluding otherwise,88 a
majority view has emerged that primary liability is appropriate where the
securities lawyer has recklessly departed from the applicable standards of
care. As discussed previously, the standards of care arise from the actual
role assumed by these lawyers, as augmented by SEC and judicial pro-
nouncements, in fulfilling their "special duties" both to the client issuer
and the nonclient investors who foreseeably rely on the securities law-
yer's work product. These standards of care require extensive lawyer in-
volvement not only in preparing a legal document, but in discovering,
verifying, and selecting the information which constitutes the content of
that document. The lawyer thus controls the flow of information to the
nonclient investor and, therefore, is properly viewed as "making" or "fur-
nishing" the information to those investors. If a misrepresentation or
omission is so made or furnished to investors by means of the disclosure
document the lawyer has prepared, then it is the lawyer, and not the cli-
ent issuer alone, who has made the misrepresentations or omissions in
connection with the investors' purchase of securities. If materiality, reli-
ance, causation, and damages are assumed, then the lawyer's ultimate lia-
bility will be determined by addressing the remaining requisite element of
Rule 10b-5, intent to deceive or scienter, as required by the Supreme
87. Id. at 68. In turn, the discussion in Felts addressing the securities lawyers' special
duties to nonclient investor was extensively relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny
& Meyers, which held that securities lawyers owe the same special duties to their clients.
O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 752 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct.
2048 (1994).
88. In In re Rospatch Securities Litigation, Judge Hillman deftly criticized three deci-
sions frequently relied upon by attorneys seeking to evade primary liability: Schatz v. Ro-
senberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986); and Abell v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). In re
Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939, at 93,973(W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992). Judge Hillman pointed out that neither Schatz nor Barker in-
volved lawyer defendants who had prepared or reviewed disclosure documents expected to
be relied upon by investors and that Abell, a decision lacking factual clarity as to exactly
what documents were prepared by defendants, was vacated. Lastly, the judge focused on
ethical grounds, citing with approval Geoffrey Hazzard's critique of Schatz for its conclu-
sion "that lawyers 'have a special immunity' from the responsibility not to assist a client in
making a representation the lawyer knows to be fraudulent." In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,979. Hazzard, one of the nation's
leading experts on legal ethics, has written that Schatz, "as a matter of legal reasoning.., is
obviously and egregiously wrong," "contradicts long-established case law," and "if it is
correct, would give lawyers a license to steal." Geoffrey C. Hazzard, Jr., Ruling Errs on
Legal, Moral Basis, 14 NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 17.
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Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.89 Because proof of actual intent is
generally difficult, the federal courts in every federal judicial circuit have
held that the scienter requirement may be satisfied by proof of reckless-
ness, generally defined as an extreme departure from the applicable stan-
dards of care. 90 If the plaintiff is unable to meet this burden, for example,
by showing that the lawyer was merely negligent under the applicable
prudent expert standard, then the lawyer will escape primary liability
under Rule lOb-5.
The court in Felts was not among the first to impose primary liability on
securities lawyers under Rule 10b-5. In 1972, the court in Blakely v.
Lisac,91 relying extensively on SEC v. Frank,92 held that an attorney with
primary responsibility for drafting the prospectus and other disclosure
documents was primarily liable to investors under Rule 10b-5 as a result
of misleading financial information set forth in the prospectus "which he
should have investigated. '93 In essence, the court found the requisite
proof of scienter from the lawyer's failure to sustain what was described
as "his due diligence defense."94 This failure of due diligence in the Rule
lOb-5 context must be viewed as equivalent to a reckless failure to abide
by applicable standards of care requiring an investigation and due dili-
gence with respect to disclosures made in the prospectus. Similarly, in
Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells,95 another court relied exclusively on
Frank to reject the defendant lawyer's contention that in reviewing and
filing various disclosure documents he was merely "a lawyer acting in a
professional advisory capacity and that such actions cannot subject him to
Rule lOb-5 liability."'96 The court simply noted that the defendant
"largely ignores SEC v. Frank, which squarely refutes this argument. ' 97
And, in In re Flight Transportation Corp. Securities Litigation,98 the court
found a duty to disclose on the part of the defendant lawyer and, hence,
potential primary liability under Rule 10b-5 based solely on the lawyer's
undertaking to prepare the allegedly false and misleading prospectus.99
These and similar decisions upholding primary liability for attorneys who
have prepared false or misleading disclosure documents find considerable
support in similar decisions upholding primary liability for attorneys who
have prepared false or misleading legal opinions in connection with se-
curities offerings.100
89. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
90. See supra note 14.
91. 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Or. 1972).
92. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
93. Blakely, 357 F. Supp. at 266.
94. Id.
95. 599 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
96. Id. at 1269.
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984).
99. Id. at 617-18.
100. See, e.g., Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980). In
this case of "flagrant fraud," a municipal bond broker dealer sold high risk industrial devel-
opment bonds to returning Vietnam-era prisoners of war as safe and secure investments.
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In recent years, the trend toward imposition of Rule 10b-5 primary lia-
bility on lawyers as a consequence of their preparation of misleading dis-
closure documents has strengthened considerably and, as stated
previously, now can be fairly described as the majority view. Certain of
these decisions are particularly instructive and should be briefly consid-
ered. The Second Circuit, in Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.,1 con-
cluded that lawyers preparing disclosure documents for securities
offerings owe a duty of disclosure to investors. The law firm defendant,
as counsel to a limited partnership issuer, had drafted an offering memo-
randum used by the client issuer to secure capital. 10 2 When the project
failed, the investors brought suit under Rule 10b-5 alleging that the law
firm had omitted and misstated material facts in the disclosure document,
including negative information regarding the background of one of the
project's promoters. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the claim,
the Second Circuit squarely held that lawyers who knowingly or reck-
lessly prepare materially misleading solicitation documents in connection
with a securities offering may be held liable as primary violators of Rule
10b-5.103
Another court, consistent with the Second Circuit's holding in Breard,
concluded that a lawyer who prepares a misleading disclosure document
is a primary participant in the securities offering. In Mercer v. Jaffee,
Snider, Raitt and Heuer, P.C,l 4 the plaintiff sought to impose primary
liability on defendant attorneys for having "'knowingly or in a reckless
disregard of the truth' approved or assisted in the preparation of false
and misleading offering circulars."105 According to the court, Rule 10b-5
primary liability requires "direct participation in the deceit at issue.' 0 6
One who undertakes to furnish information containing material misstate-
ments or omissions is a primary participant, the court stated, so long as
"not so far removed from the transmission of the misleading information
that liability would necessarily become vicarious.' 0 7 Then the court held
Among the defendants in this case were two law firms that had acted as bond counsel to
the issuer. After the district court granted summary judgment to defendants based on their
ignorance of the fraud, the Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that if defendants had partici-
pated in the issuance of the bonds, they owed a duty of disclosure to all investors. Id. at
859. See also Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (the court denied motion to dismiss by defendant lawyers, finding the affirmative
actions of the defendant lawyers in communicating the information in the bond opinion
created a duty to state omitted materials); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.
1985); Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (the court concluded attor-
neys may be liable for misrepresentations and omissions where their legal opinion becomes
materially inaccurate or incomplete). See generally Joseph L. Johnson, III, Note, Liability
of Attorneys for Legal Opinions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 27 B.C. L. REv. 325
(1986).
101. 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 143
103. Id. at 144.
104. 713 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
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that the attorneys' approval or alleged assistance in the preparation of
misleading disclosure documents constituted "conduct [that] certainly
qualifies as 'furnishing' or 'supplying' information to potential investors
in a sufficiently direct manner to impose 10b-5 primary liability."'10 8 In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
SEC v. Washington County Utility District,10 9 which explained the "direct
contacts" or "direct participation" prerequisite to primary liability under
Rule 10b-5. In that case, which relied heavily on SEC v. Coffey, 110 the
court noted that "[d]irect contacts require neither physical presence nor
face to face conversation," but is satisfied when one undertakes to furnish
misleading information."' According to the court in Mercer, this is ex-
actly what an attorney does when he undertakes to prepare a misleading
disclosure document which he knows will be relied upon by investors.
In Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine," 2 the Sixth Circuit di-
rectly confronted the issue of an attorney's primary liability under Rule
10b-5. In this case, corporate counsel for the issuer had prepared a pri-
vate placement memorandum for a debenture offering and forwarded it
to outside counsel for review. The court, after examining the record be-
low, concluded that outside counsel knew or should have known that the
offering memorandum that he edited failed to disclose certain material
facts regarding the issuer. Consistent with the principles applied in Mer-
cer, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the lawyer's involvement satisfied
the "direct contacts" test, and, accordingly, that the lawyer, as a primary
participant in the disclosure process, could be held liable as a primary
violator of Rule 10b-5.113 The court's opinion properly recognizes that
the securities lawyer, far from being an "extra" in the disclosure produc-
tion, has a starring role. Thus, the investors should not be and are not
required to prove some other special relationship between the lawyer and
themselves which would establish a separately based duty to disclose.14
In another case, In re Rospatch Securities Litigation,"5 the court fol-
lowed Molecular Technology to reach a similar result. Again, outside
legal counsel had prepared disclosure documents on behalf of the issuer
that allegedly failed to disclose the issuer's severe financial difficulties.
108. Id.
109. 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982).
110. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
111. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d at 223. See generally Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1996); SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130,
140-42 (7th Cir. 1982); Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
112. 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 918.
114. Id. at 917. According to Professor Marc Steinberg, a fellow contributor to this
Symposium Issue, the court's decision in Molecular Technology literally "means that when
lawyers draft a prospectus, there is no need to go to aiding and abetting liability, fiduciary
duty rationales, and so on." Timothy E. Hoberg, 1993 Corporate Law Symposium:
Presentations and Panel Discussion, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 533, 555 (1993) (statement by Pro-
fessor Marc Steinberg as part of a panel discussion).
115. [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939, at 93,973 (W.D. Mich.
July 8, 1992).
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According to the court, the defendant law firm was fully aware that the
documents it prepared would be made public and relied upon by the is-
suer's investors. In its defense, the law firm argued that it had no duty to
disclose to the plaintiff investors because (1) the law firm itself did not
make independent material misstatements to the investors, (2) it had no
direct dealings with the investors, and (3) it was not in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the investors. Applying the direct contacts test, the court
held that the law firm's preparation of the various disclosure documents
constituted the requisite direct contacts, and, consequently, the law firm
had a legal duty to disclose material omissions to investors in the docu-
ments that it prepared. 116 Moreover, the court rejected as inapposite the
law firm's argument that its work on the disclosure documents filed with
the SEC was not done for the purpose of selling securities. In response,
the court noted that the law firm knew the disclosure forms would be
issued to the public and read by purchasers of the issuer's securities,
clearly "enough to satisfy the requirement that the misstatements occur
'in connection with' the purchase or sale of a security." 117
The final case I will address in this Article is an important decision
decided subsequent to Central Bank, Employers Insurance v. Musick,
Peeler & Garrett,118 a controversy previously considered by the Supreme
Court on the issue of whether a cause of action for contribution was per-
missible under Rule 10b-5.11 9 The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the
attorneys and accountants were "the actual architects" of disclosure doc-
uments containing material misrepresentations and omissions. While ac-
knowledging that the aiding and abetting theory of liability decimated by
Central Bank was easier to plead than a theory of primary liability under
Rule 10b-5, the court recognized that the latter theory remained fully
available to plaintiffs against lawyers who have drafted a materially mis-
leading prospectus. The defendant lawyers asserted that this was a failure
to disclose case, and, hence, the plaintiff must first establish the attorneys'
duty to disclose to investors. Instead of turning to the "special duties" to
investors confirmed in Felts, the court pointed out that this was not a
failure to disclose case, but rather an affirmative misrepresentation or
omission case.' 20 The defendant attorneys were not completely silent, for
quite unlike the printer defendant in Chiarella v. United States,'21 they
were alleged to have drafted the entire prospectus which contained mis-
representations, with resultant omissions "arising out of an overall body
of representations made in the prospectus.' 22 Given this critical distinc-
tion, the plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate a duty to disclose
where the defendant lawyers are alleged to have participated in drafting
116. Id. at 93,979.
117. Id. at 93,980.
118. 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
119. Musick, Peeler, & Barrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
120. Musick, Peeler, 871 F. Supp at 389.
121. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
122. Musick, Peeler, 871 F. Supp. at 389.
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disclosure documents containing material omissions.123 Relying on two
Ninth Circuit opinions, In re Software Toolworks Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion124 and SEC v. Seaboard Corp.,125 the court agreed with the principle
that a secondary actor may be primarily liable when the actor's participa-
tion consists primarily of drafting and editing a securities offering disclo-
sure document. Thus, the court in Musick, Peeler, consistent with both
the "direct contacts" analysis used by the Sixth Circuit and the "duty to
disclose" analysis originating in Frank and amplified in Felts, concluded
that the defendant attorneys could be primarily liable under Rule 10b-5
based on allegations that they participated in the preparation of disclo-
sure documents that they knew or were reckless in not knowing con-
tained material misrepresentations or omissions.1 26
123. Id.
124. 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
126. In addition to those decisions discussed in this Article, numerous other courts have
also held that lawyers may be liable as primary violators of Rule lob-5 when they know-
ingly or recklessly prepare or review misleading disclosure documents. See, e.g., In re Rex-
plore, Inc. Sec. Litig. 685 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (lawyers allegedly misrepresented
that offering was exempt from registration); Resler v. Financial Group, Inc., 668 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (defendant attorneys allegedly prepared a prospectus and offering
memorandum that contained untrue statements of material facts and omitted other facts,
including negative information on the background of promotor); Cohen v. Goodfriend, 665
F. Supp. 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allegations that attorney prepared offering materials which
contained misrepresentation alleged sufficient connection between attorney and misrepre-
sentations to survive motion to dismiss securities fraud claim); Schneider v. Traweek, [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,507, at 97,652 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1990)
(law firm that drafted offering materials had a duty to disclose alleged material omissions
in light of their superior access to the information and as a result of their awareness of the
plaintiffs' reliance on the prospectuses they authored); In re North Am. Acceptance Corp.
Sec. Cases, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,258, at 91,682 (N.D.
Ga. Aug 4, 1981) (third party's reliance on advertisements that lawyers edited imposed a
duty on the law firm to investors not to violate Rule 10b-5); Hunt v. Gouverneur
Townhouse Partners, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,447, at
91,947 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1991) (allegation that law firm drafted private placement memo-
randum that it knew contained material misstatements and omissions adequately pleaded
securities fraud as the predicate act of a RICO claim); Shumate v. McNiff, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,897, at 94,910 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1990)
(investor's securities fraud claim against law firm that allegedly prepared a fraudulent pri-
vate placement memorandum stated a cause of action); Werner v. Satterlee, Stephens,
Burke & Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (investors properly stated Rule 10b-5
claim against law firm that prepared misleading prospectus); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,416, at 97,066 (C.D. Cal. July 23,
1990) (attorneys could be primarily liable under antifraud provisions for drafting allegedly
fraudulent offering materials circulated to investors); Walco Invs., Inc. v, Thenen, 881 F.
Supp. 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (law firms preparing private placement memoranda for an
alleged Ponzi scheme could be primarily liable under Rule 10b-5).
Although this Article deals with the primary liability of securities lawyers, accountants
providing services in connection with securities disclosure documents also are frequently
found to be primarily liable under Rule lOb-5. See SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir. 1982) (generally accepted accounting standards do not provide protection from
liability when an accountant fails to disclose material facts he knew or should have known
should be revealed); Bradford White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir.
1989) (liability based on accountants' failure to conduct audit in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards, where accountants represented that the audit conformed to
those standards); Spear v. Ernst & Young, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,399, at 90,739 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994) (materially false and misleading opinions
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V. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have addressed the role of securities lawyers in the
preparation of disclosure documents for securities offerings and have ex-
plained how the applicable standards of care, as derived from several im-
portant sources, impose upon those lawyers the status of primary
participants. The numerous decisions upholding the applicability of Rule
10b-5 primary liability to lawyers involved in the preparation of mislead-
ing disclosure documents are clearly consistent with the underlying dis-
closure philosophy of our federal securities laws.127 They are also
consistent with the pronouncements of the SEC, the courts, and the se-
curities bar that the effective implementation of those disclosure laws
largely depends upon compliance by securities lawyers with ethical and
professional standards designed to protect both client and investor inter-
ests. These standards not only establish the securities lawyer's extensive
involvement as a supplier of information, but also provide the prudent
expert standards of care against which scienter or recklessness will be
measured. The securities lawyer who abides by those standards, as well
as the securities lawyer who is merely negligent in undertaking to abide
by those standards, is not subject to primary liability under Rule 10b-5.
In fact, securities lawyers may well take comfort from the independence
the portent of primary liability assures. As a result of this liability risk,
the securities lawyer is better positioned to conduct his or her investiga-
tion with the required detachment, successfully substituting disclosure in-
dependence for client bias. Thus, the imposition of primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 serves to promote the symmetry of interests sought to
be achieved by both the federal securities laws and the applicable stan-
dards of care to provide improved disclosure intended to reduce invest-
ment risks for third party investors and liability risks for securities
lawyers and their clients.
or fraudulent financial statements coupled with accountants' knowledge that stock pur-
chasers would rely on opinions satisfies the "in connection with" requirement of § 10(b));
Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (accounting firm
may be primarily liable for misrepresentations and omissions by others where they have a
significant role in drafting or editing a disclosure document).
127. The "fundamental purpose" of the federal securities laws was "to substitute a phi-
losophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). See generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 171-224 (3d ed. 1989).
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